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Mapping Backsliding in the European Union 
 
When the European Union took on ten new member states in 2004, it went through an 
unprecedented enlargement that raised a number of questions about the future of the EU. 
The previous enlargements, from the original six member states to nine, then ten, twelve and 
fifteen states never admitted more than three new members at a time and the new member 
states had long track records of liberal democracy and market economies – or, in the case of 
the new Mediterranean member states in the 1980s, at least the latter. The debate about 
enlargement to formerly communist regimes began as soon as the Berlin Wall fell, and even 
in its earliest version it centred on the potential effects of a big round of enlargement on the 
EU’s capacity for governance and further integration.1 This coincided with a debate on the 
prospects for liberal democracy in terms of both party politics and public policy in the 
Europe’s new democracies.2 Apart from the questions about whether a wider Europe might 
mean more or less deepening in terms of supranational governance and increasing the scope 
of the EU’s competence, this debate also touched on the administrative capacity of the 
formerly communist states and their political will. The team put together by Paul Taggart and 
Alexs Szczerbiak focused on the latter question in particular, by examining the sources and 
consequences of popular and party-based Euroscepticism in both the old and new member 
states.3 The present policy brief takes the question debated by the Taggart and Szczerbiak 
team as a starting point: a dozen years after the first round of eastern enlargement, as 
Eurosceptic parties have come to power in some of the new member states, has there been 
"backsliding” in the EU in terms of the states’ commitments to liberal democracy? 
 
This is the first of five policy papers in a series for the EU-funded TransCrisis Horizon 2020 
research project that directly address backsliding as a possible crisis for the EU. Taken 
together, the five papers investigate and analyse the causal links between transboundary 
                                                          
1 Helen Wallace, “Widening and deepening: the European Community and the new European agenda”, RIIA  
Discussion Paper No 23, 1989; Christopher Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union 
(London: Routledge, 1997; Karen Henderson (ed.), Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the 
European Union, London, UCL Press, 1999; Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, “Eastern Enlargement: 
Strategy or Second Thoughts?”, in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European 
Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; Urich Sedelmeier and Frank Schimmelfennig, “'Theorising EU 
Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research”,  Journal of European Public Policy, 
9:4 (2002): 500-528. 
2 Gordon Smith, “Transitions to Liberal Democracy”, in Stephen Whitefield (ed.), The New Institutional 
Architecture of Eastern Europe, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993; Peter Mair, “What is Different about Post- 
Communist Party Systems?”, Studies in Public Policy No. 259, University of Strathclyde, 1996; Klaus Goetz, 
“Making Sense of Post-Communist Central Administration: Modernization, Europeanization ofLatinization?”, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 8:6 (2001), 1032-1051. 
3 Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (eds), The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, two volumes 2008. 
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crisis management and backsliding in EU member states. The first paper defines backsliding 
and explores empirical patterns of backsliding across the EU. The second, third and fourth 
papers analyse three forms of backsliding that are particularly contentious and involve 
potential problems for the EU: the rule of law (constitutional safeguards and independent 
institutions), corruption (including corruption control) and equality (gender, race and disability). 
Each of the three papers assess the extent of and causes of backsliding, and consider far it 
might be a problem for the EU. The fifth paper asks whether backsliding as such represent a 
crisis for the EU, and what policy options and tools the EU has for managing backsliding.  
 
 
BACKSLIDING ON LIBREAL DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Samuel Huntington famously argued that democratization comes in waves, and that the 
process of democratisation that started in Southern European and Latin American in the 
1970s and included the collapse of communism in Europe was the third wave – after first and 
second waves after each of the two world wars.4 Whether post-communist democratization 
should be considered a fourth wave or an extension of the third wave is itself debatable, but 
in either case post-communist democratization in Europe and Eurasia has been less of an 
unequivocal success than democratization in post-authoritarian Portugal, Spain and Greece.5 
Most of the former Soviet States (the exceptions are the three Baltic republics) have justifiably 
been described as hybrid regimes or as regimes that have reversed the commitment to 
democratization. Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey has been subject to the same kind of criticism, long 
before the crack-down after the failed military coup of July 2016. But even the EU member 
states have not been immune to accusations of democratic backsliding. Slovakia was sent to 
the back of the queue for EU membership under Vladimír Mečiar’s premiership – the only 
country to be relegated in this was on the grounds of limited progress toward liberal 
democracy (as opposed to relegation on the grounds of limited institutional or administrative 
capacity). Then in 2014 Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán declared for “illiberal 
democracy”, and cited Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia as a role model. During the previous 
four years he had used the sweeping powers that a two-thirds parliamentary majority 
afforded his government to re-write the constitutional order. In the meantime Romania had 
been shocked by the 2012 clash between president Traian Băsescu and prime minister Victor 
Ponta, even if the prime minister eventually had to back down from his effort to impeach the 
president. Then the victory of the Polish Law and Justice party in the 2015 elections and the 
party’s immediate campaign to change the constitutional order rammed home the message 
that the road to liberal democracy might not be a one-way street, even for EU member states.   
 
                                                          
4  Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press: 1991); “Democracy’s Third Wave” Journal of Democracy, 2, no. 2 (1991), 12-34. 
5  Marc F. Plattner and Larry J. Diamond, “Is East-Central Europe Backsliding?”, Journal of Democracy, 18:4 
(2007), 5-6. 
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The literature on backsliding comes in three main varieties: i) the study of democratic 
backsliding as a trend that involves a reversal of democratization, ii) the study of hybrid 
regimes in the context of development, and iii) the study of individual countries that have 
steered away from liberal democracy in one way or another, including some EU member 
states. This literature does not offer an unambiguous definition of backsliding, let alone one 
that can be operationalised in a study of backsliding in the EU. Common elements in 
definitions include reversal of democratization and the weakening of democratic institutions; 
decline of good governance, transparency and the rule of law; poor governance performance 
and/of reversal of reforms; weakening of human rights and treatment of minorities; rising 
populism, nationalism and anti-liberal public opinion; increasing corruption and state 
capture; and even – for the EU member states –  compliance with EU rules and norms and 
even the danger of a new type of democratic deficit. 
 
The literature that approaches backsliding as a trend away from democratisation focuses 
more on the question as to whether this is a trend and what causes it than on the definition 
of the concept. Indeed, like much of the literature on democratisation itself, it does not really 
need a clear definition of democratisation or reversal of democratisation since liberal 
democracy is a well-established concept.6 The editors of a special issue of Journal of 
Democracy on backsliding in East Central Europe, Marc Plattner and Larry Diamond, asked 
contributors to the issue to examine sharp political conflicts as a source of concern for the 
solidity of these countries’ democracies. They did not define backsliding, but pointed to 
concerns about lack of democratic consolidation and the danger of countries reverting to 
authoritarianism. However, they made direct reference to the assessments carried out by 
Freedom House, and asked questions about the precariousness of democracy, weakness of 
democratic institutions and the sources of dangers to democracy.7 Indeed the Freedom House 
data is widely used in the debates about democratisation and its possible reversal, and are 
used in this paper as well.8 Perhaps the clearest and most precise definition of backsliding 
linked to the concept of democratization is that offered by Lars Svåsand in his study of Malawi: 
Democratization involves a steady improvement in democratic governance, being stuck in 
transition involves lack of improvement, and backsliding – simply enough – involves the last 
alternative, namely a decline in good governance.9 Ulrich Sedelmeier offers an equally 
straightforward definition of backsliding, based on breaches of liberal democratic principles.10 
 
                                                          
6  Jacques Rupnik, “Is Central Europe Backsliding: From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash”, Journal of  
Democracy, 18:4 (2007), 17-25. 
7   Plattner and Diamond, “Is East-Central Europe Backsliding?”, p. 5-6. 
8   James Dawson and Seán Hanley, “East Central Europe: The Fading Mirage of the ‘Liberal Consensus’”, Journal 
of Democracy, 27:1 (2016), 20-34, p.23. 
9  Lars Svåsand, ”Democratization in Malawi: Moving Forward, Stuck in Transition or backsliding?”, Forum for 
Development Studies, 38:1 (2011) 1-24.  
10 Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic Backsliding in 
Hungary and Romania after Accession”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52:1 (2014), 105-121. 
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The most common theme in the literature on democratization and its reversals is democratic 
norms and commitments to basic democratic principles and the rule of law. This is directly 
linked to the strengthening, maintenance or weakening of liberal democratic institutions, and 
ultimately, of the rule of law.11 It involves a reversal of democratization leading to a hollowing 
out of liberal democracy both in form and in practice.12 Bela Greskovits thus defines 
backsliding as “destabilization and reverting to semi-authoritarian politics” or even a “reversal 
in the direction of democratic development”; Atila Ágh focuses on both formal institutions 
and democratic performance.13  
 
Much of the work on reversal of democratization also focuses on the consequent decline in 
the quality of democracy, including low transparency and state capture by elites. This is in 
effect a decline in good governance, or what Thomas Carothers calls “bad governance” and 
Ulrich Sedelmeier documents as “drops in democratic quality”.14  This kind of decline in 
democratic performance is often linked to political contestation of European integration and 
the core values of the EU, including different aspects of economic and social performance 
(including equality and discrimination).15 Writing in 2007, Charles Gati explicitly linked the 
term “backsliding” to “resistance to new and necessary political and economic reforms.”16 
Others include performance in terms of protection of human rights.17  
 
Oligarchy and low performance is in turn sometimes linked to the decline in popular support 
for democracy and the rule of law. A common theme here has been the rise of support for 
parties that advocate alternative forms of government that play down individual liberty and 
the rule of law, including support for nationalism, populism.18 Ivan Krastnev linked backsliding 
                                                          
11 Plattner and Diamond, “Is East-Central Europe Backsliding?”; Dawson and Hanley, “East Central Europe: The 
Fading Mirage of the ‘Liberal Consensus’”; Douglas M. Gibler and Kirk A. Randazzo, “Testing the Effects of 
Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding”, American Journal of Political Science, 
35:3 (2011), 696-709; Jan-Werner Müller, “Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law in Member 
States?” European Law Journal, 21:2 (2015) 141-160. 
12 Dawson and Hanley, “East Central Europe: The Fading Mirage of the ‘Liberal Consensus’”; Bela Greskovits, 
“The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in Central Europe”, paper presented at Central European 
University, 9 April 2015. 
13 Greskovits, “The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in Central Europe”; Attila Ágh, “The Triple Crisis in 
Hungary: The “Backsliding” of Hungarian Democracy after Twenty Years”, Romanian Journal of Political 
Science, 13:1 (2013). 
14 Thomas Carothers, “A Quarter Century of Promoting Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, 18:4 (2007), 113-
123, p.119; Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Europe after the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: 2004-2014, 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 10/5/2014, p.4; Plattner and Diamond, “Is East-Central Europe Backsliding?”; Müller, 
“Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law in Member States?”. 
15 Ivan Krastev, “The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus”, Journal of Democracy, 18:4 (2007), 56-63; Philip 
Levitz and Grigore Pop-Eleches, “Monitoring, Money and Migrants: countering Post-Accession Backsliding in 
Bulgaria and Romania”, Europe-Asia Studies, 62:3 (2010), 461-479. 
16 Charles Gati, “Backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe!, The Quarterly Journal, Fall 2007, 107-120. 
17 Andrew T. Guzman and Katerina Linos, “Human Rights Backsliding”, California Law Review, 102 (2014), 603-
654. 
18 Plattner and Diamond, “Is East-Central Europe Backsliding?”, p. 6; Elisabeth Bakke and Nick Sitter, ““Patterns 
of Stability: Party Competition and Strategy in Central Europe since 1989”, Party Politics 11:2 (2005), 243-
263”; Agnes Batory and Nick Sitter, “Cleavages, Competition, and Coalition-building: Agrarian Parties and the 
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to the end of the kind of “liberal consensus” that membership of the EU is based on and which 
the EU to some extent requires in order to funciton.19 However, others, like Greskovits, 
separate “hollowing out” of democracy in the sense of loss of popular support for democracy 
from backsliding as such.20 
 
In the EU context, the notion of backsliding can be related to the well-established literature 
on differentiated integration, and the question of why some states do not comply with EU 
law when the governing parties or elites decide that it is not the interest of the government 
to do so.21 Europeanisation and the effect of EU membership on democratic consolidation 
and good governance has been much debated, and increasingly this literature has turned to 
investigate the possibility that Europeanisation might be reversed.22 Most structural 
explanations of declining compliance focus on long-term economic performance or social 
integration, or the way the global financial crisis posed a disruptive challenge for fragile 
democracies.23 In any case, the financial crisis too some of the new member states to cross 
road between continued consolidation of democracy and departure from the liberal 
democratic model.24 But the direct cause of deliberate non-compliance and wilful defiance of 
inconvenient EU rules has tended to be populist parties’ rise to power.25  
 
Most of the literature on the study of hybrid regimes in the context of development likewise 
does not seek to conceptualise backsliding, but rather focuses on the different ways 
                                                          
European Question in Western and Eastern Europe”, The European Journal of Political Research, 43:3 (2004). 
521-544; Sean Hanley, “The New Right in Europe? Unravelling the Ideology of ‘Czech Thatcherism’”, Journal 
of Political Ideologies, 4:2 (1999), 169-178; Paul Taggart, New Populist Parties in Western Europe, West 
European Politics, 18:1 (1998), 34–51 
19 Carothers, “A Quarter Century of Promoting Democracy”, p.119; Krastev, “The Strange Death of the Liberal 
Consensus”, p. 58-59. 
20 Greskovits, “The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in Central Europe”, p.1 ; Greskovits draws on Peter 
Mair, “Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy”, New Left Review, 42 (Nov-Dec), 25-51. 
21 Alexander C-G. Stubb, “A Categorization of Differentiated Integration”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
34:2 (1996) 283-295; Alkuin Kölliker, “Bringing Together of Driving Apart the Union? Toward a Theory of 
Differentiated Integration”, West European Politics, 24:4 (2001) 125-151; Svein S. Andersen and Nick Sitter, 
“Differentiated Integration: What Is It and How Much Can the EU Accommodate?”, Journal of European 
Integration, 28:4 (2006), 313-330; Katharina Holzinger and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Differentiated 
Integration in the European Union:  Many Concepts, Sparse Theory, Few Data”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 19:2 (2012), 292–305; Jack Hayward and Rudiger Würzel, European Disunion, London: Palgrave, 2012. 
22 Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic Backsliding in Hungary 
and Romania after Accession”;  Sedelmeier, “Europe after the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: 
2004-2014”; Ágh, “De-Europeanization and De-democratization Trends in ECE “; Johan P. Olsen “The Many 
Faces of Europeanization” Journal of Common Market Studies, 40:5, (2002), 921–952; Claudio Radaelli 
“Whither Europeanization: Concept Stretching and substantive Change” European Integration online Papers, 
4:8 (200); Plattner and Diamond, “Is East-Central Europe Backsliding?”; Philip Levitz and Grigore Pop-Eleches, 
“Why No Backsliding? The European Union’s Impact on Democracy and Governance Before and After 
Accession” Comparative Political Studies, 43:2 (2010). 457-485.  
23 Greskovits, “The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in Central Europe”. 
24 Attila Ágh, “Post-Accession Crisis in the New Member States: Progressing or Backsliding in the EU”, Studies of 
Transition States and Societies, 2:1 (2010), 74-95. 
25 Agnes Batory, “Populists in government? Hungary's “system of national cooperation””, Democratization, 23:2 
(2016), 283-303. 
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democratization might be halted, be incomplete or be combined with institutions or practices 
that limit transitions to liberal democracy.26 Hybrid regimes that are in effect “façade 
democracy”, where illiberal practices are carried out behind seemingly democratic 
institutions and in practice amount to oligarchy where the state is captured by elites based 
on non-transparent rule and corruption.27 In hybrid regimes authoritarian practices override 
democratic institutions and make for considerable differences between formal institutions 
and the informal exercise of power.28  In most cases hybrid regimes amount to a form of 
oligarchy, where elections serve to confirm the dominant role of the leading party party and 
the ruling group uses a wide range of economic and political resources to maintain its grip on 
power. The question is whether this amounts to alternative models of democracy, such as 
“guided”, “less liberal” or even “illiberal” democracy. In any case, as in the literature on the 
reversal of democratization, the literature on hybrid regimes take backsliding to mean a 
reversal, or even just stalling, of a process. Backsliding means less or weaker liberal democracy 
in terms of the rule of law, transparent governance and pluralist governance.  
 
In the EU context the possibility that a member state might backslide to the extent that it 
becomes a kind of hybrid regime or the government is oriented towards an alternative to 
liberal democracy – and Orbán’s 2014 speech on illiberal democracy was a wake-up call for 
politicians and journalists alike in this respect – raises two questions that inform the debate 
on backsliding in the EU:  how does the oligarchic elite maintain its position and does 
backsliding matter for the EU? The first question has prompted some research into EU funding 
as a source of economic rent, which can be distributed among the oligarchs and their 
supporters.29 Backsliding is thus linked to public procurement and corruption as a resource 
for funding. Second, others have noted that the EU might have reached a point where the 
main problem of limited democratic governance in the EU is not the so-called democratic 
deficit due to the weak powers of the European Parliament, but rather a new “second 
democratic deficit” that can be found in some of its member states that are backsliding away 
from democracy.30 The obvious question is whether this is a threat to the EU as a political 
system? 
 
Finally most studies of individual countries that have steered away from liberal democracy – 
and this includes several EU member states – focus more on the causes and dynamics of 
                                                          
26 Thomas Carothers, “A Quarter Century of Promoting Democracy”, p. 119-120; Dawson and Hanley, “East 
Central Europe: The Fading Mirage of the ‘Liberal Consensus’”. 
27 Atila Ágh, “De-Europeanization and De-democratization Trends in ECE: From the Potemkin Democracy to the 
Elected Autocracy in Hungary”, Journal of Comparative Politics, 8:2 (2015), 4-26. 
28 Sedelmeier, “Europe after the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: 2004-2014”; Jacques Rupnik and 
Jan Zielonka, “The State of Democracy 20 Years On: Domestic and External Factors”, East European Politics 
and Societies, 27:3 (2013), 1-25. 
29 Ágh, “De-Europeanization and De-democratization Trends in ECE”, p. 12-13 
30 R. Daniel Kelemen, “Europe’s other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in a Democratic Union”, 
paper presented at the Council for European Studies, 8-10 July, 2015, Sciences Po; Müller, “Should the EU 
Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law in Member States?”. 
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backsliding than on defining backsliding in a way that encourages comparative analysis.31 As 
early as 2007 Charles Gati identified problems related to backsliding in all four Central 
European cases, and expressed concern that this was a trend. In Poland, he argued, the 
Kaczynski twins as president and prime minister showed “immense hostility” to the forces 
that had guided the country’s transition since 1989. In the Czech Republic president Vaclav 
Klaus’ scepticism to politics and caused a political standoff that prevented reforms. Slovakia 
saw a populist backlash against the government that had “engineered Slovakia’s economic 
miracle”, and in Hungary the then opposition party Fidesz, having lost two elections, “tried to 
seize power in the fall of 2006 via a series of demonstrations, some violent and some 
peaceful”.32 
 
Most of the case studies of Central Europe states focus on the role of populism and illiberal 
politics, and the various reasons for popular disenchantment with economic reforms and 
liberal democracy as the driving forces, and constitutional change and centralization of 
political power as the central problem with backsliding.33 Zsolt Enyedi and others have used 
Hungary to illustrate a broader trend, but Enyedi emphasises that backsliding is driven by 
actors that make idiosyncratic strategic decisions. He thus reject broader structural 
explanations.34 Likewise a series of domestic political factors including poorly calculated 
gambles lay behind the Romanian crisis of 2012. In that case, however, the EU had stronger 
leverage and could combine social pressure with the EU’s ability to exercise material pressure 
thorough the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism that still operated for Bulgaria and 
Romania at the time.35 
 
                                                          
31 Dawson and Hanley, “East Central Europe: The Fading Mirage of the ‘Liberal Consensus’”. 
32 Gati, “Backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe”, p. 107-108; Charles Gati and Heather Conley, “Backsliding 
in Central Europe”, International Herald Tribune, 3 April 2007. 
33 Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic Backsliding in Hungary 
and Romania after Accession”.  
34 Zsolt Enyedi, “Populist Polarization and Party System Institutionalisation: The Role of Party Politics in De-
Democratization”, Problems of Post-Communism (published on-line 14/1/2016) 
doi:10.1080/10758216.2015.1113883; Nick Sitter, “Absolute Power? Hungary Twenty Years after the Fall of 
Communism” in Elisabeth Bakke and Ingo Peters (eds) Twenty Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, Berlin: 
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2011; Marton Varju and Nora Chronowski, “Constitutional Backsliding in 
Hungary”, Tijdschrift voor Constitutioneel Recht, 3 (2015), 296-310. For more structural explanations that 
emphasis the nature of the economy under communism and the nature of the economic transition, see e.g. 
Zoltán Pogátsa, “Hungary: From Star Transition Student to Backsliding Member State”, Journal of 
Contemporary European Research, 4:5 (2009), 597-613; Greskovits, “The Hollowing and Backsliding of 
Democracy in Central Europe”. 
35 Agnes Batory, “Defying the Commission: Creative Compliance and Respect for the Rule of Law in the EU”,  
Public Administration, 2016 (published on-line 22/2/2016) doi: 10.1111/padm.12254; Ingi Iusmen, “EU 
Leverage and Democratic Backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Romania”, in Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 53:5 (2015), 593-608. 
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In the EU context there is a well-established literature on implementation, compliance and 
infringement, or what Kristina Mikulova dubbed “Potemkin Europeanization”.36 I the context 
of backsliding, this has been supplemented by analyses of what happens when centralisation 
of power at the state level results in clashes with EU law.37 Backsliding also raises questions 
about the meaning of the commitments to fundamental values laid down in Article 2 and the 
procedures for dealing with a member states that is in breach of these values as laid down in 
Article 7. In practice, the high thresholds for action under Article 7 means that it is likely to 
have more moral than practical value.38 Some national parties (represented through their 
governments in the Council of Ministers and European parties (in the European Parliament) 
are reluctant to use Article 7 at all, and some are reluctant to use it against governments run 
by political allies.39 Backsliding therefore points to open questions about the EU’s policy tools 
to cope with this kind of threat, if indeed it is a threat. 
 
Drawing on these three sets of literature, a relatively simple definition of backsliding can be 
put forward for the purpose of comparative analysis of backsliding in the EU: Backsliding is 
defined as unilateral and systematic acts by a member state government that violates the 
laws and/or the norms of the EU. This does not cover unilateral policy changes that are 
compatible with EU laws or guidelines (such as the British decision to leave the EU), or regimes 
that are established as an exception in the form of derogations or opt-outs (this could 
conceivable be the case if a state were permitted to relax its efforts e.g. to combat 
corruption). And it does not cover formal changes to the EU rules, whichever direction they 
might go in.  
 
Response to Crises Unilateral measures Formal changes to EU rules 
Compatible with 
present EU norms 
and rules  
Joint/coordinated crisis 
management 
New EU tools 
Treaty Change 
Incompatible with 
present EU norms 
and rules  
BACKSLIDING: Member state 
policy that involves going back 
on EU commitments 
Derogations and 
opt-outs 
 
                                                          
36 Sedelmeier, “Europe after the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: 2004-2014”; Kristina Mikulova, 
“”Potemkin Europeanization”: Dynamics of Party Competition in Poland and Hungary 1998-2004”, East 
European Politics, Societies and Cultures, 28:1 (2014) 163-186. 
37 Batory, “Defying the Commission: Creative Compliance and Respect for the Rule of Law in the EU”. 
38 Müller, “Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law in Member States?”. 
39 Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic Backsliding in Hungary 
and Romania after Accession”, 
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Based on this definition, a further distinction can be made between backsliding that violate 
EU norms and the EU laws that enshrine those norms in law, and backsliding that violates EU 
norms but for one reason or another does not violate the relevant aspects of EU law.  
 
 Hard Backsliding can be defined as acts or policies that involve direct violation of EU 
primary or secondary law (the acquis) and violates the fundamental norms and values 
of the EU linked to liberal democratic governance. This leaves a member state open 
to intervention by the Commission in the form of infringement procedures, and 
ultimately to action under Article 7.  
 
 Soft Backsliding can be defined as acts or policies that involve violation of a member 
states’ major commitments to the EU, but without directly violating the acquis, or at 
least the relevant part of the acquis. In fact soft backsliding with respect to e.g. media 
freedom can of course turn out also to violate Single Market rules on cross-border 
trade, or forced early retirement of judges can turn out to violate rules on age 
discrimination even if it does not necessarily contravene rules in the protection of 
judicial independence.40 
 
 
Violates Acquis? 
Violates Norms? 
Yes No 
Yes Hard Backsliding Soft Backsliding 
No Ordinary infringement Ordinary 
Politics 
 
The next three sections of this policy paper explores backsliding across the three central  areas 
that come up again and again in much of the literature on backsliding: first, the rule of law; 
second, corruption; and third equality. The three areas of investigation reflect three of the 
four main types of concern in the literature on backsliding. Fist, the investigation of 
backsliding in terms of the rule of law explores patterns of change with respect to the 
fundamental institutions of liberal democracy, with a focus on the core institution (at the 
expense of other, related matters such as media freedom). The second aspect, corruption and 
corruption control, is a key element of good governance (and is chosen as an alternative to 
more ambiguous indicators such as economic reform) and can also serve as an indicator of 
the problem of state capture by oligarchic elites. The third subject, social equability, is chosen 
as an indicator of backsliding against rules designed to protect minorities, as an element of 
the human rights and individual rights dimension of liberal democracy. The main theme 
touched upon in some of the literature of backsliding that is not covered in this policy paper 
                                                          
40 Batory, “Defying the Commission: Creative Compliance and Respect for the Rule of Law in the EU”. 
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is public opinion on democracy, human rights, nationalism and other matters in the liberal – 
populist divide that many authors see as a integral part of backsliding. This is because public 
opinion can be a driver of backsliding (public opinion as the demands side) and/or a 
consequence of backsliding (public approval of government’s supply side backsliding), but 
does not in itself serve us well as an indicator of backsliding.  
 
Operationally, for the purpose of this paper, hard backsliding involves a) measures that are 
contrary to EU law, and b) the Commission might choose to investigate or start infringement 
procedures over, and c) the Court might eventually rule on. Measures that satisfy only a) or 
only a) and b) are also counted. Soft backsliding is operationalised as measures that violate 
the principal norms of EU as set out in the Treaties, international law and non-binding aspects 
of EU law, policy strategies and standards. However, since the question of whether the Acquis 
is violated or not is ultimately a matter for the Commission (starting infringement procedures) 
and the Court of Justice, in most cases distinguishing between the two forms require closer 
investigation of each case than is the remit of this policy paper (the next three papers in the 
series return to this issue). The remainder of this policy paper provides an overview of the 
extent of backsliding that can be ascertained from a range of open sources and reports. It 
covers both soft and hard forms of backsliding, and does not necessarily distinguish between 
the two in the cross-country comparison in each of the three areas investigated. 
 
BACKSLIDING AND THE RULE OF LAW  
The rule of law is a fundamental building block of liberal democracy, in the sense of the rule 
of the majority within legal and constitutional limits and constraints. To the extent that 
leaders of national governments invoke a crisis (such as the financial crisis, refugee crisis or 
threat of terrorism) to limit media freedom, restrict the power of independent regulators and 
politicise the judiciary or central banks, this may constitute backsliding in terms of the broader 
constitutional safeguards of democracy that all EU member states are committed to as a 
prerequisite for membership. A range of national measures on all three counts have drawn 
criticism from the Commission and the European Parliament. In what follows, the focus is on 
the rule of law as such, including the safeguarding of independent institutions. 
The EU treaties laid down clear responsibilities to protect and adhere to the rule of law for all 
member states.  At Copenhagen, the European Council specifically defined the rule of law as 
one of the obligations of membership and the political conditions that need to be satisfied. 
The “Copenhagen Criteria” require that the candidate country much achieve, among other 
things, stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities.41 That notwithstanding, no similar method or 
instrument exists to supervise the respect of these same principles after accession. While the 
treaties stipulate commitment to democracy and the rule of law, and provide a basis for 
                                                          
41 European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, (21-22 June 1993, SN 180/1/93)12. 
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suspending the membership of states that violate these fundamental values, this remains 
very much a “nuclear option”. There are therefore relatively few cases of EU institutions even 
investigating states for direct breach of EU law in terms of their commitments to democracy, 
the rule of law and the maintenance of independent judiciary institutions. Most of the well-
known cases are a matter of soft backsliding – violations of EU norms that fall short of direct 
violation of the acquis.  
 
The data on backsliding and the rule of law used in this paper is drawn primarily from reports 
by Freedom House.42 This provides times series that covers all the member states, on a 
relatively reliable comparable basis. In addition a range of reports from the EU institutions, 
the Venice Commission, the Helsinki Commissions and investigative journalism are used to 
compile an overview of cases in which member states stand accused by authoritative 
independent sources of violation of basic EU norms with respect to the rule of law.  
 
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World annual report provides assessments of developments 
in political rights and civil liberties, composed of numerical ratings and descriptive texts for 
each country and a select group of related and disputed territories. The data is designed to 
be comparable over time and across countries. Political Rights are scored based on data from 
three subcategories (with a maximum of 40 points in total): Electoral Process, Political 
Pluralism and Participation, and Functioning of Government. Civil Liberties are scored based 
on four subcategories (to a total of 60 points): Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational 
and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law, and Personal Autonomy and Individual Right. The Rule 
of Law is a subcategory for Civil Liberties, based on questions about the independence of the 
judiciary and the workings of the police, courts and due process. Of the 28 EU states three 
countries – Bulgaria, Hungary, and Greece – have scores that indicated backsliding  both of 
the domains used here, Political Rights and Civil Liberties. In terms of the rule of law, they 
drop from 13-14 points to 10-11 points over the decade up to 2016. The data is reported in 
Annex 1. 
 
 
European Union Institutions 
The rule of law is one of the fundamental values on which the EU is based according to Article 
2 of the Treaty on European Union.  The article explicitly states that “[t]he Union is founded 
on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. (…) [F]ailure 
by a Member State to respect these values may lead to the suspension of that Member State's 
rights deriving from membership of the Union (Article I-59)” 43. Nevertheless, it has been 
                                                          
42 See Annex 1. 
43 Treaty on European Union, Official Journal C 326 , 26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390.  Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:12012M/TXT    
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pointed out that the current EU legal framework is ill designed when it comes to addressing 
internal, systemic threats to the rule of law.  This has become a significant issue to the extent 
that rule of law related crises appear to have gained both on intensity and regularity in the 
past decade44.  
In a well-noted speech on 4 September 2013, Viviane Reding, former EU Justice 
Commissioner, drew an interesting parallel between Europe’s economic and financial crisis 
and what she viewed as an increasing number of ‘rule of law crises’ revealing problems of a 
systemic nature.45 Three concrete examples were mentioned in her speech: 
 The French government’s attempt in summer 2010 to secretly implement a collective 
deportation policy aimed at EU citizens of Romani ethnicity despite contrary 
assurances given to the Commission that Roma people were not being singled out;  
 The Hungarian government’s attempt in 2011 to undermine the independence of the 
judiciary by implementing an early mandatory retirement policy; and  
 The Romanian government’s failure to comply with key judgments of the national 
constitutional court in 2012.  
 
Taken together, these episodes have been often understood as demonstrating the increasing 
number of instances where national authorities were undermining key EU values such as the 
rule of law. In his 2012 State of the Union address, José Manuel Barroso, then the President 
of the European Commission, spoke of worrying ‘threats to the legal and democratic fabric in 
some of our European states’ which need to be brought into check.46  The EC has expressed 
particular concern over developments taking place in Hungary.  Recently Hungary’s Prime 
Minister has advocated the establishment of an ‘illiberal state’ and referred to Putin’s Russia 
and Communist China as two possible models to follow.47 The EU considers that the call for 
an illiberal regime starkly contradicts Article 2 TEU.  The issuing of Tavares Report48 by the 
European Parliament in 2012 signalled a change in the approach to Hungary from treating it 
as a state with a few isolated problems to a systemic problem.  
 
                                                          
44 Dimitry Kochenov and Laurent Pech, “Upholding the Rule of Law in the EU: On the Commission’s ‘Pre-Article 
7 Procedure’ as a Timid Step in the Right Direction.”  EUI Working Papers,  Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies Global Governance Programme 2015, 164.   
45 Viviane Reding, “The EU and the Rule of Law – What’s Next?”, 2013, Press Release Database, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-677_en.htm     
46 José Manuel Barroso, State of the Union 2012 Address, 2012, Press Release Database, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm    
47 EUObserver, Brussels, 28 July 2014  ‘Orban Wants to Build an Illiberal State’, available at: 
https://euobserver.com/political/125128  
48 European Parliament Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on the situation of fundamental rights: 
standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012) 
(2012/2130(INI)), available at:  
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-0229&language=EN  
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The landslide victory of nationalist Law and Justice Party in Polish 2015 elections was marked 
by fast paced developments, including replacement of previous judicial appointees to the 
country’s constitutional court and passing changes to the rules regulating the court that 
would make it harder for it to block legislation. On January 13, 2016 The European Union’s 
executive branch reprimanded Poland after determining that it had failed to uphold the rule 
of law.  On April 13, 2016 MEPs passed a non-binding resolution calling on the Polish 
authorities to restore the ability of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal to uphold its Constitution 
and guarantee respect for the rule of law49. 
 
The vice-president of the Commission, Frans Timmermans, and his lawyers accuse the Polish 
government of "systematically endangering" the rule of law in Poland. They said that changes 
in the composition of Poland's constitutional court and the circumvention of its modus 
operandi restrict the independence of the judiciary in a manner that contravenes European 
principles of the rule of law50. These basic principles are laid down in the Lisbon Treaty, to 
which of course Poland, as a member state, is of course also a signatory. The situation has 
been aggravated by the government's refusal to publish and recognize the court's judgments.  
The proceedings against Poland constitute a rare intervention that reflects increasing alarm 
in the West about the government’s commitment to democratic norms.   
 
Venice Commission  
The concept of the “Rule of Law”, along with democracy and human rights, makes up the 
three pillars of the Council of Europe51  and is endorsed in the Preamble to the European 
Convention on Human Rights52.  A democracy watchdog, the Venice Commission closely 
monitors developments in the field of constitutional law.  Since 2008 the Commission issued 
16 negative opinions, which clearly demonstrate backsliding tendencies countries including 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Poland.  The state of the rule of in Hungary received 
particularly critical attention, resulting in an unprecedented number of opinions issued 
between 2011 and 2015.   The Commission has criticized the far reaching Constitutional 
reforms and systematic curbing of media freedom by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s 
government.  
 
 
 
                                                          
49 European Parliament resolution of 13 April 2016 on the situation in Poland (2015/3031(RSP)).  Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-
0123+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN  
50 European Commission, “Commission adopts Rule of Law Opinion on the situation in Poland”, 2016, Press 
Release Database, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2015_en.htm   
51 Statute of the Council of Europe,  London, 5.V.1949, Article 3, available at: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680306052   
52 European Convention on Human Rights, Rome, 4.XI.1950, Preamble, available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf   
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Table 1 Bulgaria  
Opinion on the Constitution of Bulgaria adopted by the Venice Commission at its 74th Plenary Session (Venice, 14-15 
March 2008) 
Opinion on the draft Act to amend and supplement the Constitution (in the field of the Judiciary) of the Republic of 
Bulgaria, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 104th Plenary Session (Venice, 23-24 October 2015) 
 
Table 2 Hungary  
Opinion on three legal questions arising in the process of drafting the New Constitution of Hungary - Adopted by the 
Venice Commission at its 86th Plenary Session ( Venice, 25-26 March 2011) 
Opinion on the new Constitution of Hungary adopted by the Venice Commission at its 87th Plenary Session (Venice, 17-
18 June 2011) 
Opinion on Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges and Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation 
and Administration of Courts of Hungary, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 90th Plenary Session (Venice, 16-17 
March 2012) 
Opinion on Act CCVI of 2011 on the right to freedom of conscience and religion and the legal status of churches, 
denominations and religious communities of Hungary adopted by the Venice Commission at its 90th Plenary Session 
(Venice, 16-17 March 2012) 
Opinion on Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court of Hungary adopted by the Venice Commission at its 91st Plenary 
Session (Venice, 15-16 June 2012) 
Opinion on Act CLXIII of 2011 on the Prosecution Service and Act CLXIV of 2011 on the Status of the Prosecutor General, 
Prosecutors and other Prosecution Employees and the Prosecution Career of Hungary, adopted by the Venice Commission 
at its 91st Plenary Session (Venice, 15-16 June 2012) 
Opinion on the Act on the Rights of Nationalities of Hungary adopted by the Venice Commission at its 91st Plenary Session 
(Venice, 15-16 June 2012) 
Opinion on Act CXII of 2011 on informational Self-determination and Freedom of Information of Hungary, adopted by the 
Venice Commission at its 92nd Plenary Session (Venice, 12-13 October 2012) 
Opinion on the Cardinal Acts on the Judiciary that were amended following the adoption of Opinion CDL-AD(2012)001 on 
Hungary, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 92nd Plenary Session (Venice, 12-13 October 2012) 
Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 95th 
Plenary Session, Venice, 14-15 June 2013 
Opinion on Media Legislation (ACT CLXXXV on Media Services and on the Mass Media, Act CIV on the Freedom of the 
Press, and the Legislation on Taxation of Advertisement Revenues of Mass Media) of Hungary, adopted by the Venice 
Commission at its 103rd Plenary Session (Venice, 19-20 June 2015) 
 
Table 3 Poland  
Opinion on amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland, adopted by the Venice 
Commission at its 106th Plenary Session, (Venice , 11-12 March 2015)   
 
Table 4 Romania  
Opinion on the compatibility with Constitutional principles and the Rule of Law of actions taken by the Government and 
the Parliament of Romania in respect of other State institutions and on the Government emergency ordinance on 
amendment to the Law N° 47/1992 regarding the organisation and functioning of the Constitutional Court and on the 
Government emergency ordinance on amending and completing the Law N° 3/2000 regarding the organisation of a 
referendum of Romania, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 93rd Plenary Session (Venice, 14-15 December 2012) 
Opinion on the Draft Law on the Review of the Constitution of Romania, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 98th 
Plenary Session, (Venice, 21-22 March 2014) 
 
In 2016 the attention fell on “constitutional crisis” unravelling in Poland following a landslide 
victory of the conservative party Law and Order (PIS). The government has effectively 
precluded the Court from ruling on the constitutionality of legislation. This weakens a key 
pillar of the democratic rule of law – and thus is highly problematic for Poland and Europe 
alike.  The instantaneous reform to the constitutional tribunal was criticized in the Opinion on 
Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland Adopted at 
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106th Plenary Session March 11-12 2016. The released report stated that some of the changes 
were a threat not just to rule of law, but to democracy and human rights.53 
 
 
Helsinki Committee 
Backsliding in the field of the rule of law has also been documented in numerous reports 
issued by the Helsinki Committee.  In 2009 Bulgarian legislative amendments proposed by the 
Justice Ministry for reform in the Meetings and Rallies Act were criticized by Bulgarian Helsinki 
Committee for posing seriously restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly54.  The 
Committee also commented extensively on the ongoing violation of media freedom, 
deteriorating respect for judicial independence, and rampant corruption55. Similar criticisms 
were directed in 2009 at Croatia by the Human Rights House Foundation56.  However, the 
strongest disparagement was once again directed at Hungary57.  On numerous occasions The 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee expressed concerns over Constitutional amendments which 
undermined judicial independence, stripped the Constitutional Court of significant powers, 
and introduced several legal provisions previously ruled unconstitutional.  The Committee 
also criticized media laws in particular the lack of political independence of media regulator 
the Media Council.  
 
In the beginning of 2016 Helsinki Committee turned its attention to Poland.  In January 2016 
the Netherlands Helsinki Committee joined an appeal by the Civic Solidarity Platform NGO 
coalition, expressing concern about amendments in the Polish media and judiciary 
legislation58. In July 2016, the Management Board and the Board of Directors of the Helsinki 
Foundation for Human Rights and the Helsinki Committee in Poland have issued a joint 
statement regarding the changes in the Polish judiciary. “What is done to the Constitutional 
Tribunal and the personnel that forms the body is ridiculing the rule of law and the state. 
                                                          
53 Venice Commission, 106th Plenary Session, Opinion on Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the 
Constitutional Tribunal of Poland, Opinion no. 833/2015, available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2016)001-e 
54 Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 2009, New legislative amendments proposed by the government will restrict 
freedom of peaceful assembly. Available at: http://www.bghelsinki.org/en/news/bg/single/new-legislative-
amendments-proposed-by-the-government-will-restrict-freedom-of-peaceful-assembly/  
55 Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 2013, A Bulgarian Spring? Entrenched Protests Challenge Eastern Europe’s 
Status Quo.  Available at:  http://www.bghelsinki.org/en/news/bg/single/bulgarian-spring-entrenched-
protests-challenge-eastern-europes-status-quo/  
56 Human Rights House Foundation, 2009, Freedom of expression violations in Croatia. Available at: 
http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/12503.html   
57 The Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2015, Analysis of the Performance of Hungary’s “One-Party Elected” 
Constitutional Court Judges Between 2011 and 2014.  Available at: http://helsinki.hu/wp-
content/uploads/EKINT-HCLU-HHC_Analysing_CC_judges_performances_2015.pdf   
58 Netherlands Helsinki Committee, 2016, Concerns over the rule of law in Poland.  Available at: 
http://www.nhc.nl/news/Concerns_over_the_rule_of_law_in_Poland.html?id=716&highlight=+EU   
TransCrisis Deliverable 6.1: Policy paper mapping backsliding 
 
17 
 
Simultaneously, other bodies that are formally independent, have come under major 
pressure”59, wrote the signatories of the statement. 
 
Since 2010 the committee issued more than 20 reports about Hungarian ‘illiberal’ reforms 
and violation of principles enshrined in the Polish Constitutions.  The main message is that 
these two countries now jeopardize European democratic norms.    
 
Since 1990s the Committee has not criticized any other member state.  
 
 
Trends  
The overall trends confirm the expectation that backsliding with respect to the rule of law is 
primarily a problem for the new member states (the 13 that joined in 2004 or later) – with 
the two old member states in trouble being Italy and Greece. Going by the Freedom House 
data, some 10 member states have a solid record over the eight years since 2008, 3 have a 
mixed record, 5 are somewhat problematic on more than one count (Slovakia, Latvia, 
Romania, Croatia and Italy) and 3 show serious and persistent problems (Hungary, Bulgaria 
and Greece). When this is combined with data and report from the EU, Venice Commission 
and the Helsinki Committees, Hungary and Poland emerge as the to front runner in terms of 
backsliding (the Polish case is so recent that the impact on Freedom House data has yet to 
become manifest). Bulgaria and Romania also make an appearance on several list, but do not 
compare with Hungary and Poland when it comes to the substantial qualitative reports for 
the EU, Venice Commission and the Helsinki Committees. Of the old member states, Italy and 
France have on occasion raised concerns, but the most persistent case of backsliding is 
Greece. Again, however, none of these are comparabvle to the Polish and Hungarian case in 
terms of severity.  
 
 
BACKSLIDING AND CORRUPTION  
 
To the extent that the economic crisis has merited extraordinary measures, it has provided 
an opportunity for political actors – particularly populist parties - to advocate or claim to step 
up anti-corruption campaigns. These are often politically motivated. Crisis measures may also 
have changed opportunity structures on the national level in ways that might affect both the 
level and type of corruption. Likewise, the crisis may have provided an opportunity for 
changing anti-corruption legislation, and in some cases dampen anti-corruption efforts for 
instance by cutting resources for national institutions tasked with corruption control. 
                                                          
59 Helsinki Committee in Poland, 2016, The Constitutional Role of the Judiciary in Poland Has Been Completely 
Undermined. Available at:  http://www.hfhr.pl/en/the-constitutional-role-of-the-judiciary-in-poland-has-
been-completely-undermined/  
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Mapping Corruption  
There is relatively little hard backsliding with respect to corruption, largely because this is 
primarily a matter for the member states in terms of legislation. It is often treated as a matter 
of crime, or even organized crime.  The main EU laws pertinent to corruption and corruption 
control is related to the EU’s financial interests – notably in terms of rules on public 
procurement, the Structural Funds spending and the work of European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF).  Most of the information on backsliding on corruption is a matter of soft backsliding, 
such as the new member states’ commitment at the time of accession to curb corruption 
(corruption was treated as part of accession conditionality, i.e. the Copenhagen criteria, at 
the time of enlargement).  
However, capturing patterns of soft backsliding across member states is extremely difficult. 
The main problem is the availability of measurement tools.  To date there is no completely 
reliable method of indicating the overall volume or frequency of corrupt transactions in a 
country. The most commonly used quantitative indicators are the World Bank (WB) 
Governance Indicators /Control of Corruption indicator60 and Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI).61 Both are composite indices that are limited by the 
reliability of the sources they draw on; and both draw on perceptions of corruption rather 
than ‘solid’ data on actual occurrence of corruption and therefore are relatively poor for 
indicating trends over time, particularly changes in relatively short periods of time. The 
weakness of the quantitative indicators is evident in the sense that many countries seem to 
follow different patterns in the CPI and WB indicator; i.e. the data contradict rather than 
confirm patterns shown by one or the other. An additional indicator, the Nations in Transit62 
expert evaluations score, exists only for the new member states and can therefore not be 
used for comprehensive cross-EU comparison. Finally the Global Corruption Barometer63 
survey respondents in a wide range of countries on their actual experiences of corruption as 
well as perceptions of how and to what extent they see various institutions affected by 
corruption in their country. However while the Barometer is a more reliable tool for indicating 
the extent of everyday forms of corruption in a country (petty corruption or bureaucratic 
corruption), it misses out on the much more important phenomenon of high level political 
corruption and state capture – which is as a potential problem for both democracy and for 
the EU as an organization. 
                                                          
60 World Bank Development Research Group, Natural Resource Governance Institute, and Brookings 
Institution, 1996-2014, Worldwide Governance Indicators.  Available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home  
61 Transparency International: The Global Coalition against Corruption, 1995-2015, Corruption Perceptions 
Index. Available at:  http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview  
62 Freedom House: Nations in Transit, 2003-2016, Corruption Rankings. Available at:   
https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit  
63Transparency International: The Global Coalition against Corruption, 2003-2015, Global Corruption Barometer.  
Available at:  http://www.transparency.org/research/gcb/overview  
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Trends  
In the absence of better indicators that would be available for the whole time period and for 
the whole group of EU countries, a number of conclusions can still be drawn from the CPI and 
WB data about the state of corruption in EU member states. First, in terms of overall levels, 
the EU is characterized by great heterogeneity: among the current member states one finds 
both the countries perceived as ‘cleanest’ globally, notably the Scandinavian member states, 
and also some medium corrupt countries that do ‘worse’ than many developing countries in 
generally more challenging governance contexts. Among the latter Greece, Italy and a 
number of ‘new’ member states – Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia - stand out, in the negative 
sense, as rather corrupt (CPI data). Second, it is worth pointing out that a number of new 
member states do well in EU comparison: for instance Estonia compares well with several 
long standing member states suggesting that North-South may be a relevant division in 
Europe. Nonetheless, the quantitative indicators confirm the commonly held opinion that 
corruption is a problem chiefly in the post-communist part of the EU as well as Italy and 
Greece.  
In terms of developments over time, the methodological limitations of the data are most 
constraining.  With this caveat, a number of observations can still be made. Most importantly, 
for the majority of EU countries the pattern is stagnation rather than marked upward or 
downward swings in perceived levels of corruption. This is not to say that individual countries’ 
values remained constant over the past decade or so but rather that, at least according to the 
quantitative data sets, only relatively minor or temporary changes can be observed for the 
majority of EU member states.  However, with respect to a number of individual countries, 
some trends may nonetheless be pinpointed. First, Poland is shown in the data sets to have 
improved considerably over the past ten years, from one of the regional laggards to one of 
the cleanest countries among the new member states. A similarly positive though less marked 
trend can be observed with respect to Estonia, which was however in any case among the 
post-communist countries with a least severe corruption problem. On the other hand, at least 
the WB data shows Hungary and Slovenia to have declined in the rankings. Among the old 
member states, Greece and Italy are shown to have a negative trend in levels of perceived 
corruption in the last few years. 
 
The (direct) impact of the economic crisis 
The WB and TI data both show relatively little change from the early 2000s to the early 2010s, 
and no marked impact in the late 2000s that could be directly attributed to the financial and 
economic crisis. This is to some extent surprising: it would have been reasonable to expect 
that the crisis created fertile conditions for corruption to ‘erupt’. On the one hand, the crisis 
may have boosted corrupt practices in the sense that the stimulus packages – the injection of 
public funds into the economy as a crisis measure – impacted on supply side factors. On the 
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other hand, in many countries the crisis necessitated austerity measures that meant cutting 
budgets for the civil service and public administration, which may have translated into both 
greater temptation for civil servants to supplement their income from corrupt sources and 
decreased the chances of detection – both factors, opportunity and risk, having been linked 
to corruption.64 In the latter respect, cutting the budget of watchdogs, such as anti-corruption 
agencies or other specialized anti-corruption bodies – as was the case in Latvia and Lithuania, 
for instance65 – is especially relevant.  
 
Country specific factors: politics (indirect impact of the crisis)  
Since no overarching pattern of either backsliding or improvement can be observed for the 
new member states – or indeed for the EU 28 overall – it is evident that what happened in 
the member states that do show marked change in either direction is in large part due to 
country specific factors, namely political dynamics. The rather small number of success stories 
in corruption studies, where very corrupt countries managed to clean up public life in a short 
period of time, all point to the importance of political will: namely, that a concerted, focused 
effort was made by policy-makers resulting in the introduction and implementation of a whole 
range of anti-corruption measures. Conversely, a worsening corruption situation is due to the 
reluctance or passivity of ruling elites in affecting change or upholding past achievements, 
which results in window-dressing or no concrete action. Moreover, ruling parties, or a cartel 
of the main parties in and out of government, can actively make matters worse when rather 
than just standing by they build support or consolidate their power by capturing the state – 
this is a situation when corruption is not an anomaly but integral to the functioning of the 
whole system. In a number of new member states this pattern of state capture is closest to 
describing the current state of affairs. The economic crisis may have had an indirect role in 
this in some cases in the sense of creating fertile conditions for large scale electoral swings 
and for new governments taking office to redesign political institutions in a way that enabled 
state capture.  
 
Pre-accession vs post-accession dynamics 
Another relevant consideration for the new member states is the impact of conditionality. 
Prior to accession, the EU demanded stringent anti-corruption measures as part of the 
Copenhagen criteria and this indeed induced governments in the then candidate countries to 
                                                          
64 Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 
65 European Commission, Lithuania: Anti-Corruption Report, Brussels, COM(2014) 38 final; European 
Commission, Latvia: Anti-Corruption Report, Brussels, COM(2014) 38 final; Gabriel Kuris, Balancing 
Responsibilities: Evolution of Lithuania’s Anti-Corruption Agency 1997-2007, Princeton University Case Study 
2012; Gabriel Kuris, Surmounting State Capture: Latvia’s Anti-Corruption Agency Spurs Reforms 2002-2011, 
Princeton University Case Study, 2012 
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pass legislation (transparency and freedom of information) and set up anti-corruption 
institutions and mechanisms, including FOI ombudsmen and specialized anti-corruption 
bodies (agencies, prosecutors and even tribunals). However, upon accession the leverage 
afforded by conditionality to the Commission disappeared (with the exception of the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Bulgaria and Romania). This resulted in many 
new member states losing momentum for anti-corruption measures. An important factor to 
note here is that the Commission’s, and more broadly the EU’s, powers in the anti-corruption 
area are rather limited vis-à-vis the member states. In sum, stagnation or backsliding in the 
new member states post-accession is consistent with expectations and findings from the 
existing literature on conditionality. 
Whether either of these possible explanations holds can only be analysed on the level of the 
member states, though qualitative research. 
 
 
BACKSLIDING AND EQUALITY  
To the extent that the economic crisis has promoted reduced spending and downgrading of 
the policy priorities associated with equal opportunities and measures to combat 
discrimination, a pertinent empirical question is whether some national measures have 
stepped back from commitments made within the European equality framework.  
The prohibition of discrimination is a fundamental principle of the European Union. The EU 
adopts legislation against discrimination on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.  This legislation does not prohibit discrimination in 
all areas of life, but in a number of specified key areas such as employment. EU Member States 
have an obligation to implement EU law in their national legislation and to apply it correctly, 
and thus there is considerable scope for hard backsliding in terms of violation of the acquis.  
However,  even where EU law requires institutions to be established or lays down procedures 
and standards, the amount of discretion left to the member states means that there is also 
substantial scope for soft backsliding: national measures that violate EU norms but without a 
direct breach of EU law. In many cases, the reality is a mixture of hard and soft backsliding. 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, a legally binding document since 2009, in its Article 21 
contains a prohibition on discrimination on various grounds. Until 2000 the body of EU law 
covered gender equality, including areas such as pensions, pregnancy and statutory social 
security regimes, but in the context of employment and social security. In 2000, two directives 
were adopted: the Employment Equality Directive prohibited discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, religious belief, age and disability in the area of employment; the Racial 
Equality Directive prohibited discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity in the context of 
employment, but also in accessing the welfare system and social security, and goods and 
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services.66 In 2004, the Gender Goods and Services Directive expanded the scope of sex 
discrimination to the area of goods and services.67 The two latter Directives stipulate the 
establishment of independent equality bodies for gender and racial equality.  
 
Equality and non-discrimination is a relatively recent area of concern for the EU and thus 
comparative methodology for measuring progress overtime, tailored to fit the EU policy 
context, continues to be limited.   The majority of indicators measure social inequalities and 
progress or backlash along those lines, but very few capture policy input and outputs. In 
addition, while equality can be perceived as an integrated policy field, its various aspects 
continue to be addressed in isolation. Gender equality, race and ethnicity, and disability are 
viewed as the major separate fields, with LGBTI rights emerging more recently. The few, 
fragmented, and mostly one-off indicators that exist are in ‘silos’.  This makes it difficult to 
capture trends and patterns of intersectional policy field with standardized set of quantitative 
indicators.  Therefore, for the purpose of mapping potential backsliding trends data was 
reviewed alongside an array of qualitative sources, and indexes developed for purposes of 
this particular mapping exercise.   
 
 
Mapping Equality: Gender, Race, Disability  
The policy brief maps backsliding trends in three fields of equality – gender, race, and 
disability – domains in which literature on crisis is most robust.  In line with EU legislative and 
normative frameworks, these three domains are treated separately, however we 
acknowledge their intersectionality and compare member states’ performance on all three 
domains.   
 
 
Gender  
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the promotion of equality 
between men and women throughout the European Community became one of the essential 
tasks of the Community.  With time all Member State transposed Directive 2004/113/EC on 
gender equality in the access to and supply of goods and services and Directive 2006/54/EC 
on gender equality in employment and occupation committing to designate and make the 
                                                          
66 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of 
the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation.  Official Journal of the European Union, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32006L0054; Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing 
the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Official Journal of 
the European Communities 19.7.2000, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32000L0043 
67 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services. Official Journal of the European Union, 
available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004L0113  
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necessary arrangements for a body or bodies for the promotion, analysis, monitoring and 
support of equal treatment of all persons without discrimination.  In addition the Member 
States have developed equality strategies and action plans in line with EU frameworks that 
promote gender equality into all its policies and regulations.  
 
The indicators for measuring potential hard and soft backsliding were inferred from country 
reports prepared by the European Network of Legal Experts in the Field of Gender Equality 
and Non-Discrimination68 and from the European Commission report “The impact of 
economic crisis on the situation of women and men and on gender equality policies”.69  We 
have decided to focus on policy inputs bringing analytical attention on the weakening of 
institutional and legislative frameworks; de-prioritization of gender mainstreaming; and 
introduction of austerity measures that directly or indirectly impact gender equality.  For that 
purpose we established six composite indicators to be researcher on a case by case basis:  
 
A) retrenchment of equality bodies  
B) retrenchment of gender equality strategies  
C) reduction in family benefits, 
D) reduction in maternity/paternity allowance  
E) reductions in public sector (wages/personnel)  
F) pension reform   
 
The retrenchment of equality bodies and equality strategies (A and B) considers the 
weakening of institutional and legislative frameworks established for the purpose of breaking 
down barriers, eliminating discrimination and ensuring equal opportunity and access both in 
employment, and to goods and services.  It captures downgrading and loss of independence 
of gender equality bodies (changes in legal status, restrictions in competences, downgrading, 
reduction in budgetary provisions, political pressure to eliminate the agencies) and de-
prioritization of gender mainstreaming and awareness rising activities.  Reduction in family 
benefits and maternity/paternity allowance looks at disproportionate gender impact of 
austerity related policies that directly and indirectly impact gender equality.  It also measures 
decrease in ex-ante gender evaluation and impact studies, which appraise the adequacy of 
planned/operating measures to promote equal opportunities between men and women and 
to prevent discrimination.  Reduction in public spending indicators captures job cuts and pay 
freezes in the public sector.   Given that women are overrepresented in public sector (i.e. 
administration, health care, social service delivery) systematic reduction and freezes have negative 
                                                          
68 The Network issues 2 country reports per year that focus on political and policy developments in the field.  We 
analysed all the reports issued between 2006 and 2015 on all Member States. Data was compiled according 
to four categories: policy developments, legislative developments, institutional developments, research 
developments.   See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/document/index_en.htm#h2-9  
69 European Commission, The impact of economic crisis on the situation of women and men and on gender 
equality policies, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013. 
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impact on gender equality.  Similarly, pension reform (cuts in public pensions and changes in age) 
considers the possibility of negative impact on gender equality.  
 
Reflecting on the EU legislation and norms in the area of gender equality, we consider 
retrenchment of equality bodies as hard backsliding, retrenchment of equality strategies as 
soft backsliding, reduction in benefits, allowance and pensions as a mixture of hard and soft 
backsliding and cuts in public sector as soft backsliding.   (See Annex 3 Table 1)  
 
 
Race  
As a result of the transposition of the Race directive of 2000, anti-discrimination laws establish 
a consistent set of rights and obligations across all EU countries, including procedures to help 
victims of discrimination.  Member States are obliged to provide protection against 
discrimination in employment and training, education, social protection (including social 
security and healthcare), social advantages, membership and involvement in organizations of 
workers and employers and access to goods and services, including housing. All Member 
States have established specialized bodies to provide independent assistance to victims of 
racial discrimination.  In line with EU integration framework, they develop strategies to 
promote diversity and integration of ethnic minorities (the Roma), indigenous communities, 
and non-EU nationals. 
 
Indicators for measuring backsliding in the field of race equality were derived from the 
monitoring reports prepared by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
(ECRI)70.  We also analysed shadow reports compiled by the European Network against Racism 
and Race Equality Directive shadow reports prepared by the Open Society Foundation.71 As in 
the case of the gender equality domain, we focused on institutions and anti-discrimination 
legislation. The selected set of indicators includes: 
 
A) retrenchment of legislation to combat racism and racial discrimination  
B) retrenchment of specialized bodies 
C) retrenchment of integration policies  
 
 
                                                          
70 We analysed all the ECRI reports issued between 2008 and 2015 on all Member States.  Data was compiled 
according to three leading themes – hate-speech, violence, integration.   European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance, 1998-2015, Country Monitoring Work.  Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/countrybycountry_en.asp     
71 European Network against Racism, Racist Crime in Europe, ENAR Shadow Report 2013-2014.  Available at: 
http://www.enar-eu.org/IMG/pdf/shadowreport_2013-14_en_final_lowres-2.pdf. European Network 
against Racism with support of PROGRESS, and  the Open Society Foundation, Racism in Europe Shadow 
Report 2011-12. Available at: http://www.enar-eu.org/IMG/pdf/shadowreport_en_lr_3_.pdf   
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Retrenchment of legislation to combat racism and racial discrimination pertains to laws and 
available legal tools that prevent and penalise direct and indirect discrimination based on 
racial or ethnic origin. The indicator captures weakening of available protection and responses 
to offences involving racism and racial discrimination.  It also assesses the effectiveness of the 
provisions for combating the dissemination of racist ideas as well as incitement to commit 
and the commission of discriminatory acts or acts motivated by hatred.   Retrenchment of 
specialized bodies looks at the degree of their independence (both in law and in fact) the 
scope of their remit and resources available for monitoring, collecting data, and instigating 
legal procedures.  Finally the retrenchment of integration policies brings attention to 
strategies and schemes that promote diversity and equal opportunities, provide assistance to 
vulnerable groups and prevent discrimination through various mechanisms (i.e. immigration 
integration programmes, Roma inclusion strategies).  Focus rests on reduction in budgetary 
allocations and targeting scope, as well as de-prioritization of integration objectives and 
awareness rising campaigns.  
 
In addition we examined socio-political context in each member state in order to capture a 
potential surge in right-wing extremist groups and political parties, an intensification of hate-
speech in public discourse, and an increase in violent acts taken against immigrants and racial 
minorities. Here we found worsening of conditions across the board in European countries.  
 
Reflecting on the EU legislation and norms in the area of racial equality we consider 
retrenchment of legislation and specialized bodies as hard backsliding and the retrenchment 
of integration policies as soft backsliding.  (See Annex 3 Figure 2)  
 
 
Disability   
European Member States have all made commitments to combat disability discrimination, 
and specifically, the disability provisions of the Employment Equality Directive (Directive 
2000/78/EC, henceforth: the Directive).   Accordingly disabled people should have access to 
measures that ensure choices and control of life on an equal basis with others.  They should 
be able to decide where and with whom they live, knowing that there are a range of support 
services (including personal assistance) to support ‘living and inclusion in the community' 
without isolation or segregation from that community. The EU has become party to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,72 which is the first international legally-
binding instrument setting minimum standards for rights for people with disabilities. All 
member states have signed the Convention, and 21 have also ratified. The Convention sets 
the highest standards of commitments on MS concerning the rights of disabled persons.  
                                                          
72 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopted on 13 
December 2006, came into force on 3 May 2008.  Available at: 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml  
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In order to measure potential backsliding in the disability domain we turned to the European 
Disability Forum’s “Report on the impact of the crisis on the rights of persons with 
disabilities”73.  In addition we analysed reports prepared by the European Network for 
Independent Living and European Coalition for Community Living and various independent 
national studies.74  The focus rested on cuts to disability support framework, including 
disability allowance and pensions, supported employment and care services.  The indicators 
include: 
 
A) Retrenchment of de-institutionalization process 
B) Supported Employment Cuts 
C) Support/Care Services Cuts 
D) Disability Allowance/Pensions Cuts 
E) Restrictive Needs Assessment 
 
De-institutionalization (A) captures cuts to independent living services and weakening of the 
right to Personal Assistance.  The next three indicators (B/C/D) pertain to cuts in resources 
and services available to disabled persons, as part of austerity measures and fiscal 
consolidation plans.  Restrictive needs assessment relate to policies which limit access to 
benefits only to those with ‘long-term disability’ and those who are fully dependent on care.    
 
Given that disability services rest in the EU normative framework, we categorize all five 
indicators as soft backsliding.  (See Annex 3 Figure 3) It is important to note that the 
categorization given by the “Report on the impact of the crisis on the rights of persons with 
disabilities” at times run counter to patterns inferred from ENIL reports and national studies. 
This is due largely to a more complex understanding by the report of the ‘roll back’ on 
commitments to disability policy framework that goes beyond single indicators. Thus at the 
present moment the presented data should be treated with caution and the inconsistencies 
must be explained through an in-depth case study analysis of individual countries.   
 
 
 
                                                          
73The report demonstrates the impact of economic crisis on persons with disability in two main fields – economic 
participation and political and social participation.  Countries not covered in the report include Cyprus, 
Finland, Germany, Luxembourg and Malta.  European Disability Forum, 2014,  “Report on the impact of the 
      crisis on the rights of persons with disability”.  Available at:   http://www.edf-feph.org/Page_Generale.asp? 
DocID=13854&thebloc=13856  
74 European Network for Independent Living (2014) Comparing the Cost of Independent Living and Residential 
Care. Available at: http://www.enil.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Cost-survey_FINAL1.pdf.  European 
Network for Independent Living and European Coalition for Community Living (2014) Shadow Report on the 
Implementation of Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the European 
Union.  Available at: http://www.enil.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Shadow-Report-11-04-2014-final-
WEB-1-1.pdf    European Network for Independent Living (2013) Personal Assistance Services in Europe.  
Available at: http://www.enil.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/European-Survey-on-Personal-Assistance-
Final.pdf  
TransCrisis Deliverable 6.1: Policy paper mapping backsliding 
 
27 
 
Comprehensive assessment  
In the final stage of the mapping exercise, we aggregated the indicators into three broad 
categories –gender, race, disability – in order to show how each Member State perform in 
these domains.  This exercised allowed us to identify countries with strong backsliding 
propensities. (See Annex 3 Figure 4)  
 
 
Trends  
Comparing the three domains by frequency of backsliding value of the composite indicators, 
disability appears as the most vulnerable equality agenda with eleven countries showing step-
backs. But this vulnerability pertains to less than half of the EU member states. Importantly 
though most of the disability indicators we used have financial implications and are all 
indicators of soft backsliding.  
 
Countries are rather divided in the gender equality field: 11 countries show no backsliding 
along the chosen indicators, 9 show clear patterns of backsliding, and the rest are inconsistent 
along the various selected indicators.  
 
Race equality emerges as the most resilient domain with 18 polities showing no change in 
policy directions. Importantly though two of the three indicators we used here are showing 
hard backsliding, and only one is soft backsliding.  
 
We have identified three clusters of countries according to their policy input/output 
indicators measured separately in three equality domains. The first cluster is composed by 
the backsliding polities that showed unequivocal backsliding in at least two equality domains 
(marked red): Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Spain, and the UK. With the exception of three countries in the cluster, gender equality was 
subject of step-backs everywhere with disability as the second most vulnerable domain. This 
cluster is surprisingly diverse, cutting across East-West and North-South divides within 
Europe. The reasons for converging performance of UK and Spain in equality polices will be 
particularly interesting puzzle for the in-depth analysis. 
 
The second cluster of countries is composed by those that show mixed policy performance 
identified by mixed values of all three indicators or by those that show diverging performance 
in the three domains (marked in white). These countries are: Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, 
and Slovenia. This cluster is also diverse. It is noteworthy that among these countries one 
could find ones that were heavily hit by 2008 financial and economic crisis and the ones with 
less poisonous effects.  
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The third cluster is composed by those member states that have been able to resist to forces 
and invitations to roll back their equality policies (marked green). This list is composed by the 
remaining last third of the 27 member states: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden. The Nordic 
countries’ and the Benelux group’s location is not surprising. Bulgaria’s Malta’s, Poland’s, 
Portugal’s and Slovakia’s resilience, however, will deserve special attention at further stages 
of the research. Overall, one third of EU member states have shown unequivocal backsliding 
in equality policies in the post-2008 years. By the same token, one third of the counties was 
able to avoid stepping-back on commitments and fundamental achievements regarding 
equality in the EU.    
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
In the last few years much has been made of democratic backsliding in the European Union, 
both in the media and in politics, and in academia. This policy paper represents an effort 
systematically to map the extent of backsliding in the EU, by focusing on three select areas – 
the rule of law, corruption and equality – that are at the core of the debates about backsliding. 
The question was driven by two broader questions – whether backsliding has become a more 
severe problem in the EU as a consequence of the financial crisis and whether this represents 
a new transboundary crisis for the EU. The first step was mapping backsliding. The results 
across three areas are more or less in line with the broad expectations based on that Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Bulgarian would be the most serious cases since these are the cases 
that have received most attention by journalists, politicians and academics. However, the 
data is less clear and unambiguous than might be anticipated, and the comparative data 
suggests that some aspects of backsliding are more prevalent actors the EU than might have 
been expected. Three points merit particular attention. 
 
First, the comparative data does indeed confirm that the “usual suspects” – Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Bulgarian – represent the most serious cases of backsliding Unsurprisingly, given 
that it came about after the 2015 elections, the Polish case only show up in more recent 
reports. But even Hungary, which along with Poland is the most problematic case in terms of 
“illiberal democracy”, is not a clear-cut leader in backsliding in other important areas. In terms 
of corruption, the worst performers in the new member states are Romania, Bulgaria and 
Slovakia, with Hungary joined by Slovenia, Italy and Greece as countries with a worsening 
corruption problem; and in terms of equality, Hungary is joined by the Czech Republic, 
Romania, Latvia and Lithuania and four old member states. Even in terms of democracy and 
the rule of law it is the reports of the EU institutions, Venice Commission and the Helsinki 
Committees that single out Hungary and Poland – and to a lesser extent Romania and 
Bulgaria. In terms of the Freedom House data, Hungary is joined by Bulgaria and Greece, but 
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not Romania or Poland. It is noteworthy that according to our data Bulgaria has not stepped 
back from its thin equality policy infrastructure. 
 
Second, the comparative data indicates that backsliding is a much broader problem in terms 
of the states that score high on the backsliding scale in one of the three areas, and that 
elements of backsliding is present in both new and old member states. France stands 
alongside Hungary, Poland and Romania as the recipients of criticism from the European 
Commission regarding political backsliding. Greece and Italy join five of the new member 
states as poorer performers in terms of corruption. The indicators for equality were less 
straightforward and require more elaborate work, but in terms of the overall assessment 
Ireland, the UK, Spain and Italy all have scores put them among the five worst new member 
state performers. 
 
Third, the comparative analysis suggests that backsliding is far from a uniform or 
homogeneous phenomenon. The literature on backsliding points to democratic institutions 
(the rule of law), process, transparency and performance (good governance), and human 
rights (including equality), as well as political opinion and legitimacy as core elements of 
democratic backsliding. However, the states the perform worst in terms of democratic 
backsliding are not necessarily the ones that perform worst on good governance or human 
rights, at least if corruption and equality is anything to go by. Whereas political backsliding is 
high-profile, limited to a few significant cases and has drawn much attention, mapping 
backsliding on equality requires more work on composite indexes and shows a broader 
pattern of states going back on some of the commitments they have made as liberal 
democratic EU member states. Corruption lies somewhere between the two: it is largely 
shaped by domestic politics, but might consequently be expected to follow political 
backsliding with a time lag if and when elites’ centralisation of political power goes together 
with efforts to capture political rents. Moreover, the long-standing cases of Greece and Italy 
demonstrated that corruption can have many causes, and be unrelated to political backsliding 
or the financial crisis. 
 
Much of the literature on democratic backsliding inside and outside the EU has focused on 
select countries and been based on singe or comparative case studies. The mapping of 
backsliding in the EU set out in this policy paper suggests that this in indeed an appropriate 
way to study backsliding. Although comparative data demonstrates that backsliding is a more 
serious problem in some (mostly new) member states, the comparative analysis set out in this 
paper also suggests that backsliding is a heterogeneous phenomenon that usually has 
country-specific characteristics, causes and dynamics. The next three papers in this series 
therefore take a case study approach, and proceed with investigation of select pairs or small 
sets of countries to assess the causes and consequences of backsliding in democracy and the 
rule of law, corruption and corruption control and equality with respect to gender, race and 
disability.  
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Annex 1 (Rule of Law)  
 
 
Freedom House – Freedom in the World Index75  
 
Freedom in the World is an annual global report on political rights and civil liberties, composed of 
numerical ratings and descriptive texts for each country and a select group of related and disputed 
territories.  A country or territory is assigned two ratings (7 to 1)—one for political rights and one 
for civil liberties—based on its total scores for the political rights and civil liberties questions. Each 
rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest 
degree of freedom, corresponds to a specific range of total scores 
 
Political Rights  
 
The political rights questions are grouped into three subcategories: Electoral Process (3 
questions), Political Pluralism and Participation (4), and Functioning of Government (3).  The 
political rights section also contains two additional discretionary questions. The highest score that 
can be awarded to the political rights checklist is 40 (or a total score of 4 for each of the 10 
questions). 
 
Yearly scores from 0-40 (0 lowest score /40 highest score)  
 
Civil Liberties  
 
The civil liberties questions are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief 
(4 questions), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and Personal Autonomy 
and Individual Rights (4).  The highest score that can be awarded to the civil liberties checklist is 
60 (or a total score of 4 for each of the 15 questions). 
 
The Rule of Law  
 
The Rule of Law is a subcategory for Civil Liberties.  The highest score that can be awarded to the rule 
of law checklist is 16 for the three questions which include: (1) Is there an independent judiciary? (2) 
Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters?  Are police under direct civilian control? (3) 
Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups 
that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies? (4) Do laws, policies, 
and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population? 
 
  
                                                          
75 https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016  
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Table 1 – Freedom House, Political rights  
 
  
Political Rights PR - (0-40) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Austria 40 40 40 40 40 40 39 39 39 39 38 38 38 37
Belgium 39 40 39 39 40 39 39 40 39 40 40 40 40 40
Bulgaria 36 36 36 36 36 36 35 35 35 34 34 31 33 33
Croatia 31 31 34 35 35 35 35 36 36 36 36 36 36 37
Cyprus 39 39 39 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 37 37 38
Czech Republic 37 37 37 37 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 37 38 38
Denmark 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Estonia 37 37 38 39 39 38 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 38
Finland 40 38 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
France 39 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Germany 38 40 40 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
Greece 36 36 37 37 37 37 37 36 36 35 35 35 35 35
Hungary 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 36 36 32 32
Ireland 38 40 40 40 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
Italy 38 38 38 39 38 38 38 37 37 36 35 37 36 36
Latvia 36 36 36 36 36 35 34 33 33 33 33 33 34 35
Lithuania 38 38 35 36 36 36 37 37 37 37 37 37 38 38
Luxembourg 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 39 38 38
Malta 40 40 40 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
Netherlands 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Poland 37 37 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Portugal 40 40 40 40 40 40 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
Romania 32 32 28 30 32 32 34 34 34 34 32 35 34 34
Slovakia 36 36 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 36
Slovenia 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 39
Spain 39 38 38 38 39 39 40 40 40 40 39 39 39 39
Sweden 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
UK 40 39 39 39 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
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Table 2 – Freedom House, Civil Liberties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Civil Liberties 0-60
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Austria 58 59 59 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
Belgium 56 59 59 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 57 57 57 56
Bulgaria 50 50 51 51 50 49 47 47 47 47 47 47 46 47
Croatia 49 48 48 49 50 50 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Cyprus 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 56 56 55 55 55 56 56
Czech Republic 47 52 56 55 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
Denmark 59 59 59 58 58 58 57 56 57 58 58 58 58 58
Estonia 50 52 55 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Finland 59 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
France 56 57 57 55 56 55 58 58 57 57 57 57 57 53
Germany 56 58 59 58 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 56
Greece 45 50 52 51 52 52 51 50 50 50 48 48 48 48
Hungary 52 52 55 56 55 55 55 54 53 52 52 52 50 47
Ireland 55 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 57
Italy 54 54 53 53 54 54 52 52 52 53 53 53 53 53
Latvia 50 50 51 53 53 53 53 53 52 51 51 51 51 51
Lithuania 51 52 52 54 54 54 54 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
Luxembourg 57 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Malta 59 59 59 59 59 58 59 58 58 58 58 58 58 57
Netherlands 58 60 59 59 59 59 59 59 58 59 59 59 59 59
Poland 51 52 54 54 53 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
Portugal 58 58 57 57 57 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
Romania 46 47 44 45 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Slovakia 47 51 53 54 54 54 54 53 53 55 55 54 53 53
Slovenia 54 54 53 54 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
Spain 53 53 53 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 56
Sweden 59 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 59 59 60
UK 57 58 58 57 58 57 57 56 57 56 57 57 57 55
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Table 3 – Countries which demonstrate backsliding tendencies (3 points or more on the scale from 0-
40)  
 
 
 
Table 4 – Countries which demonstrate backsliding tendencies (3 points or more on the scale from 0-
60)  
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Bulgaria, Hungary, and Greece are three countries that backslide in the two domains – Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties  
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Table 5 – Backsliding and political rights. Average calculated by adding yearly scores (between 0-40) 
and dividing it by number of years (14). 
 
Green = Strong performers  
Purple = Average performers   
Orange = Weak performers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Rights 
Member State Average Backsliding
Denmark 40
Netherlands 40
Sweden 40
Finland 39.9
Luxembourg 39.9
UK 39.8
Belgium 39.6
Portugal 39.4
Malta 39.2
Ireland 39.1
Austria 39 BACKSLIDING
Germany 39
Spain 39
Estonia 38.5
Cyprus 38
France 38
Slovenia 38
Poland 37.8
Czech R. 37.6
Italy 37.2 BACKSLIDING 
Lithuania 36.9
Slovakia 36.7
Greece 36 BACKSLIDING 
Hungary 36 BACKSLIDING
Croatia 34.9
Bulgaria 34.7 BACKSLIDING 
Latvia 34.5 BACKSLIDING 
Romania 32.6
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Table 6 – Backsliding and civil liberties. Average calculated by adding yearly scores (between 0-60) 
and dividing it by number of years (14). 
 
Green = Strong performers  
Purple = Average performers   
Orange = Weak performers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Liberties 
Member State Average Backsliding 
Finland 59.9
Sweden 59.7
Luxembourg 59.7
Netherlands 58.9
Malta 58.3
Austria 58.1
Denmark 57.9 BACKSLIDING 
Ireland 57.7
Portugal 57.7
Belgium 57.6
Germany 57.1
Uk 56.9 BACKSLIDING 
France 56.4 BACKSLIDING 
Cyprus 56.2
Spain 56
Czech R. 55.7
Estonia 55.2
Poland 54.2
Slovenia 53.2
Italy 53
Lithuania 53
Slovakia 53
Hungary 52.8 BACKSLIDING 
Latvia 51.6
Greece 49.6 BACKSLIDING 
Croatia 49.5
Bulgaria 48.2 BACKSLIDING 
Romania 48
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Table 7 – Backsliding and the rule of law. The Rule of Law is a subcategory for Civil Liberties Average 
calculated by adding yearly scores (between 0-16) and dividing it by number of years (11). 
 
Green = Strong performers  
Purple = Average performers   
Orange = Weak performers  
 
 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Greece are three countries that backslide in the two domains – Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties  
  
Aggregated Scores Rule of Law 
Member State Average Backsliding 
Finland 16
Luxembourg 16
Sweden 15.9
Malta 15.3
Austria 15
Belgium 15
Cyprus 15
Germany 15
Ireland 15
Portugal 15
Netherlands 14.9
Denmark 14.7
UK 14.5
France 14.4
Spain 14.2
Estonia 14
Slovenia 14
Czech R. 13.9
Lithuania 13.4
Poland 13
Slovakia 12.2
Hungary 12.1 BACKSLIDING 
Italy 12
Latvia 12
Romania 11.9
Greece 11.5 BACKSLIDING 
Bulgaria 11.3 BACKSLIDING 
Croatia 10.8
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Annex 2 (Corruption)  
 
 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
 
 
World Bank Control of Corruption Indicator  
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Nations in Transit 
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Transparency International Corruption Perception Index76  
 
  
Standardise data sources to a scale of 0-10 where a 0 equals the highest level of perceived 
corruption and 10 equals the lowest level of perceived corruption77.  
 
First 5 figures show countries according to their overall average (calculated by adding all the yearly 
scores and dividing it by 12).  
Figure 6 shows all the post-socialist countries (without Croatia).  
 
Figure 1 
 
                                                          
76 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview  
77 As of 2012 the index score has been adjusted see: 
http://tiukraine.org/sites/default/files/u/124/docs/e._corruption_perceptions_index__an_updated_metho
dology_for_2012_1.pdf  
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Figure 2 
 
Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
 
 
Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
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World Bank Corruption Control Index78 
The indicators are reported in their standard normal units, ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.  
First 6 figures show countries according to their overall average (calculated by adding all the yearly 
scores and dividing by 12)  
Graph 7 shows all the post-socialist countries (without Croatia)  
 
Figure 7 
 
                                                          
78 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc  
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Figure 8 
 
 
Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
 
 
Figure 11 
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Figure 12 
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Nation in Transit79 
 
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest 
level of democratic progress. The ratings follow a quarter-point scale. Minor to moderate 
developments typically warrant a positive or negative change of a quarter point (0.25), while 
significant developments warrant a half point (0.50). It is rare for any category to fluctuate 
more than a half point in a single year.  
 
1. Corruption Index 
 
Figure 13 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
79 https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit  
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2. Independent Media Index 
 
Figure 14 
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Annex 3 (Equality) 
 
Figure 1 Gender   
 
 
 
(RED) backsliding on at least four indicators 
 (GREEN) resisting roll backs on at least four indicators 
(WHITE) mixed performance  
 
 
↓ - decrease in performance  
↔– no change in performance  
N/D – no data available  
 
  
Gender Hard Indicator Soft Indicator Hard/Soft Indicator Hard/Soft Indicator Soft Indicator Hard/Soft Indicator
Member States
Equality Bodies 
(Retrenchment) 
Equality 
Strategies/Policies 
(Retrenchment) 
Reduction in family 
benefits/ childcare 
services 
Reduction in 
Maternity/Paternity 
leave  (time and 
allowance) 
Public Sector  
(wages/personel) 
Pension  
Austria  ↔ ↔ ↔  
Belgium  ↔ ↔ ↔  ↔
Bulgaria ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔  
Cyprus ↔  ↔ ↔  N/D
Czech Republic  ↔ ↔   ↔
Denmark ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔  ↔
Estonia      
Finland ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
France  ↔ ↔ ↔  
Germany ↔ ↔ ↔   ↔
Greece ↔ ↔  N/D  
Hungary   ↔ ↔  
Ireland   N/D N/D  
Italy  ↔ ↔   
Latvia      
Lithuania   N/D   
Luxembourg  ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
Malta ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
Netherlands ↔ ↔  ↔  ↔
Poland ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
Portugal ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔  
Romania      ↔
Slovakia  ↔ ↔ ↔  
Slovenia ↔ ↔ ↔   
Spain   ↔   
Sweden ↔ ↔ ↔  ↔ ↔
UK      
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Figure 2  Race  
 
 
 
(RED) backsliding on at least two indicators 
 (GREEN) resisting roll backs on at least two indicators 
(WHITE) mixed performance  
 
 
↓ - decrease in performance  
↔– no change in performance  
N/D – no data available  
↑ -  overall increase in hate speech and violence against immigrants and racial minorities (this data 
was not used to categorize performance of individual member states)  
 
  
Race Hard Indicator Hard Indicator Soft Indicator 
Member States
Legislation to 
combat racism and 
racial discrimination 
(retrenchment) 
Speicalized 
Bodies  
(retrenchment) 
Integration Policies   
(retrenchment) 
Hate Speech in 
public discourse 
(politicians, 
political parties, 
media) 
Extremist 
groups/political 
parties 
Violent Acts 
against immigrants 
and racial 
minorities
Austria ↔ ↔ ↔  ↑  ↑  ↑
Belgium ↔ ↔ ↔  ↑  ↑ N/D
Bulgaria ↔ ↔   ↑  ↑  ↑
Cyprus ↔ ↔   ↑ N/D  ↑
Czech Republic     ↑  ↑  ↑
Denmark ↔ ↔ ↔  ↑ N/D N/D
Estonia ↔ ↔ ↔ N/D N/D N/D
Finland ↔ ↔ ↔  ↑ N/D ↓
France ↔    ↑  ↑  ↑
Germany ↔ ↔ ↔  ↑  ↑ N/D
Greece ↔ ↔   ↑  ↑  ↑
Hungary  ↔   ↑  ↑  ↑
Ireland ↔  N/D N/D N/D N/D
Italy   ↔  ↑ ↑  ↑
Latvia     ↑ N/D N/D
Lithuania     ↑ N/D  ↑
Luxembourg ↔ ↔ ↔ N/D N/D N/D
Malta ↔ ↔ N/D N/D N/D N/D
Netherlands ↔  ↔  ↑ N/D ↓
Poland ↔ ↔ ↔  ↑  ↑  ↑
Portugal ↔ ↔ ↔ N/D N/D N/D
Romania    N/D N/D N/D
Slovakia ↔ ↔   ↑  ↑ N/D
Slovenia N/D  ↔ N/D N/D N/D
Spain ↔ ↔ ↔ N/D N/D N/D
Sweden ↔ ↔ ↔  ↑  ↑  ↑
UK ↔  ↔  ↑ N/D  ↑
Socio Political Context 
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Figure 3 Disability  
 
(RED) backsliding on at least three indicators 
 (GREEN) resisting roll backs on at least three indicators 
(WHITE) mixed performance  
 
    
 
↓ - decrease in performance  
↔– no change in performance  
N/D – no data available  
 
  
Disability Soft Indicator Soft Indicator Soft Indicator Soft Indicator 
Member States Supported Employment Support/Care  
services 
Disability 
Allowance/ Pension
Needs 
Assessment 
Austria ↓ ↓ ↔ ↓
Belgium ↔ ↔ ↔ ↓
Bulgaria ↓ ↔ ↔ ↓
Cyprus N/D N/D N/D N/D
Czech Republic N/D ↓ ↓ ↓
Denmark ↔ ↓ ↔ ↓
Estonia ↓ ↓ N/D ↔
Finland ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
France N/D ↓ ↓ ↓
Germany N/D N/D ↓ ↔
Greece N/D ↓ ↓ ↓
Hungary ↓ N/D ↓ ↓
Ireland N/D ↓ ↓ ↓
Italy N/D ↓ ↓ ↓
Latvia N/D N/D ↓ N/D
Lithuania N/D N/D ↓ ↓
Luxembourg N/D N/D N/D N/D
Malta N/D N/D N/D N/D
Netherlands ↔ ↔ ↓ ↔
Poland ↓ ↔ ↔ ↔
Portugal ↓ ↓ ↓ N/D
Romania ↓ ↓ N/D ↔
Slovakia ↓ ↔ ↔ ↔
Slovenia ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
Spain ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Sweden N/D N/D N/D ↓
UK ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
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Figure 4  Aggregated Indicators   
 
(RED) backsliding polities that show unequivocal backsliding in at least two equality domains  
 (GREEN) resisting polities that show no roll backs in at least two equality domains  
(WHITE) mixed policy performers that show diverging performance in the three equality domains 
 
 
↓ - decrease in performance  
MIX – mixed pattern  
↔– no change in performance  
N/D – no data available  
 
 
 
Member States Gender Race Disability 
Austria MIX ↔ 
Belgium ↔ ↔ ↔
Bulgaria ↔ ↔ MIX
Cyprus MIX ↔ N/D
Czech Republic MIX  
Denmark ↔ ↔ MIX
Estonia  ↔ MIX
Finland ↔ ↔ ↔
France MIX  
Germany ↔ ↔ MIX
Greece MIX ↔ 
Hungary   
Ireland  MIX 
Italy   
Latvia   MIX
Lithuania   MIX
Luxembourg ↔ ↔ N/D
Malta ↔ ↔ N/D
Netherlands ↔ ↔ ↔
Poland ↔ ↔ ↔
Portugal ↔ ↔ 
Romania   MIX
Slovakia MIX ↔ ↔
Slovenia MIX MIX ↔
Spain  ↔ 
Sweden ↔ ↔ MIX
UK  ↔ 
